DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 097 387 UD 014 574

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TITLE The Functions of Conflict: School Desegregation in 91 Cities.
PUB DATE Apr 74
NOTE 32p.; Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association annual meeting (Chicago Illinois, April 1974)

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.75 HC-$1.85 PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS Activism; Black Community; Black Power; *Boards of Education; *Conflict; Demonstrations (Civil); Educational Policy; Negro Attitudes; *Policy Formation; *Public Policy; Racial Integration; *School Integration; Social Structure; Surveys; Urban Schools

ABSTRACT

This paper pursues the question: "When is conflict functional to a proponent of change?" Interview data from school desegregation controversies in 91 Northern cities is used. Four major findings from the data show ways in which conflict seems to both facilitate and hinder effects to obtain desegregation: On the one hand, cities with militant black populations are more likely to have the issue of school desegregation come up, and desegregation is more likely to occur if the school board has a high level of internal conflict; but at the same time both civil rights demonstrations and grass roots anti-integration activity by whites seem self-defeating. Five hypothesis are drawn from the findings: (1) A non-issue can be made salient by a powerless group with conflict-raising tactics. (2) The pressure of a tradition of conflict is a facilitator of change. (3) Grass roots activity without the support of some elites is often ignored by other elites. (4) Conflict is generally dysfunctional if a decision for change must be made by an informal decision rule based on consensus politics. (5) Conflict-increasing tactics are less likely to be self-defeating, and may be helpful, in a group with compulsory attendance and a decision-making rule requiring less than unanimity. Examples of groups with compulsory attendance are bureaucracies, legislative bodies, and firms. (Author/JM)

ED 097387

The Functions of Conflict:

School Desegregation in 91 Cities

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April, 1974

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The Functions of Conflict: School Desegregation in 91 Cities

Abstract[1]

This paper pursues the question "when is conflict functional to a proponent of change" and uses interview data from school desegregation controversies in 91 Northern cities. Four major findings from the data show ways in which conflict seems to both facilitate and hinder effects to obtain desegregation: On the one hand, cities with militant black populations are more likely to have the issue of school desegregation come up, and desegregation is more likely to occur if the school board has a high level of internal conflict; but at the same time both civil rights demonstrations and grass roots anti-integration activity by whites seem self-defeating. We draw from the findings five hypotheses:

1. A non-issue can be made salient by a powerless group with conflict-raising tactics.
2. The pressure of a tradition of conflict is a facilitator of change.
3. Grass roots activity without the support of some elites is often ignored by other elites.
4. Conflict is generally dysfunctional if a decision for change must be made by an informal decision rule based on consensus politics.
5. Conflict-increasing tactics are less likely to be self-defeating, and may be helpful, in a group with compulsory attendance and a decision-making rule requiring less than unanimity.

Is conflict functional or dysfunctional? This vague question is central to a number of debates in political science and sociology. In this paper we focus on one specific version of this general questions: When is conflict functional to a change agent who is attempting to change the status quo and who does not have a large amount of resources? Our data deal with the de facto school desegregation issue in Northern cities, and is a good example of this common situation. We hope this paper will encourage others to consider the question as it applies to other types of change agents and other types of issues.

We are here concerned with the common-sense interpretation of conflict : disagreement which results in the participants becoming angry, upset, inconvenienced or otherwise uncomfortable because of the conduct of the debate. It is this kind of community conflict which Coleman[2] is concerned with, and which above a certain threshold becomes what William Gamson has called "rancorous conflict."[3] That this sort of conflict intuitively is considered dysfunctional is reflected is the necessity for Coser to write a book entitled The Functions of Social Conflict.[4] Let us assume that the participants in a decision have at least some latitude to increase or decrease the level of conflict; they can choose whether to attack an opponent on a personal level or not, to call a traffic-jamming demonstration as opposed to a private negotiating session, etc. Given this assumption, we can ask two questions: 1. Was school desegregation more likely to occur where participants did or did not engage in conflict-increasing tactics? 2. One tactic which is almost

always conflict-increasing is the use of grass roots demonstrations either for or against desegregation. Were these generally effective or not?

SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION

The data on which this paper is based are part of the data collected for a research project which examined de facto school segregation controversies in 91 northern U.S. cities.[5]

We wanted as large a sample of school desegregation controversies as possible, and chose our sample cities from the National Opinion Research Center's Permanent Community Sample of 200 cities.[6] The Permanent Community Sample is a national probability sample of all American cities which had a population of 50,000 or more in 1960; the cities are sampled proportional to population, including all cities of over 150,000 persons. We selected from the PCS all cities which had at least 3,000 blacks and were "outside the South." "Outside the South" included those cities in the southern census region which ceased maintaining de jure segregated school systems immediately after the 1954 Brown decision.

Using these procedures, our final sample containing 91 cities, and omits only 4 northern cities of over 250,000 population; the median population in the sample is approximately 200,000.

Within each sample city, interviewers from the National Opinion Research Center administered a series of 18 interviews with

selected informants (see Table 1). In addition, a self-administered questionnaire was completed by the Education Reporter of the major newspaper in each city. Informants[7] were selected by a mixture

(Table 1 about here)

of "positional" and "reputational" methods, i. e. some were interviewed because they held a particular job or post; others by asking informants to recommend people to us.

In summary, this technique is an effort to apply the standardized procedures of survey research to city problems, treating the city as the unit of analysis and "interviewing the city" by using standardized questionnaires administered to informants selected in a standardized way. Responses from different informants were combined in the same way that scales are built in a conventional survey.

In this paper we focus on the effects of conflict and conflict-producing tactics within the overall political context of the school desegregation controversy. Correlation and regression analysis is used in the general model shown in Figure 1. Various background characteristics of the city (taken from the census) are correlated against both the initial appearance of the issue and the way it was resolved; then the behavior of the school board and the superintendent, the civil rights movement, the mayor and the "civic elite", and white "grass roots" groups are introduced as intervening variables to explain the outcome of the controversy. We first present four findings from the analysis, concerning the effects of civil rights demonstrations, of white grass roots support for and protests against desegregation, and of conflict within the school board.

After stating the findings, we list five more general hypotheses based on these findings.

First Finding: Conflict-Increasing Tactics Seem to Have Been Necessary to Make School Desegregation an Issue

Thanks to the writings of Schattschneider, Bachrach and Baratz, and Crenson,[8] we know to ask the question "What preconditions enabled school desegregation to become an issue?"

In each city we defined a more-or-less comparable concept, "The First Major Demand (FMD) for the improvement of black education made to the school systems in each of our sample cities after 1960." Doing this forces our data to "begin at the beginning" and gives us a sequential time-ordering of the issue that is general enough to be common to most northern cities, and yet is specific enough to allow us to make meaningful and comparable distinctions among cities.

Sixteen of our sample cities experienced no First Major Demand. At least there was nothing that our informants felt could be classified as such. Given the pervasiveness and scope of the civil rights movement in the 1960's, how did these 16 cities manage to escape the desegregation controversy?

Table 2 correlates the absence of a demand with selected characteristics. We see that cities which did not experience FMD's were smaller, and had populations which were more educated, more wealthy, more professional, and whiter. In essence,

they seem similar to suburban communities (although they are not all suburbs). But why are these types of communities less likely to be faced with a desegregation issue? One reason may have been that there was less need. It is not true that these cities are less segregated than others. More interesting, white and black informants evaluate the quality of education minority children receive in these sixteen cities favorably. We asked nine of our informants to rate the job they thought their city schools were doing, compared to other cities like it. Even if citizens thought the schools were doing a good job when in fact they were not, this (misinformed) belief could be enough to spare the school system from outside demands. We have no reason to believe that our informants are basing their judgement on objective data; it seems more likely that they thought the schools were doing a good job in the no-FMD cities because the issue had not been raised.

Very often we don't consider anything to be a problem unless and until conflict and controversy force us to consider it. The quality of black education usually does not become an issue until blacks define it as such; if the black and civil rights organizations in a city are unorganized, weak, or conservative (reflected in these data in their later reluctance to endorse "black power" ideology) we would not expect them to make demands for the improvement of black education.

The lower part of Table 2 provides evidence to support this view; the correlations indicate that in the no-FMD cities, civil rights organizations were less interested in acquiring black economic and

political power; black political and cultural organizations were less prevalent; blacks hold fewer city-wide offices and were elected later, and in general the local civil rights movement was not very militant. These sixteen cities may not have experienced an FMD because the civil rights organizations were not strong enough or not interested enough to mount an attack on the school system.

If we look at the variables in Table 2 again, we see that many of them are characteristics we intuitively associate with a black community which is not oriented toward conflict-increasing tactics. It makes sense that not all black communities either want conflict or find conflict tolerable. Our first finding therefore suggests that conflict-raising civil rights activity accomplished some of the functions Coser attributes to conflict; it make others aware of the issue, called into question norms and conditions, and brought the conflicting parties together. It was only then that relationships could be established and a dialogue begun.

The Outcome of the Desegregation Debate

School systems initially responded to the demand for desegregation in a luke-warm fashion, typically appointing a committee to study the problem.[9] The civil rights movement replied in turn by calling for southern-style non-violent demonstrations. The result was a debate, punctuated by further demonstrations, over the next several months, and in some cases several years. By 1969, when the issue

began to burn itself out, most cities had responded by taking a wide variety of actions. The next task of the research was to create a scale of the degree to which actions taken by the schools met the symbolic goals of the movement. We are here less interested in the actual amount of desegregation (which was generally still very small in almost all of the cities by 1969) but in the degree to which the actions reflected a commitment to desegregate.

We recorded 27 actions which school systems took, and divided them into three broad categories: those actions which were only precedural or symbolic, those which required no more than voluntary participation on the part of whites, and those that compelled white participation. Within each category we ranked the actions from least radical (or least pro-integration) to most radical, based on a composite judgement of the number of students involved or the amount of opposition the typical community would mount to such an action. This enabled us to rank the 27 acts. The first colum of Table 3 indicates the percentage of cities reporting each type of action (the least radical actions were frequently not reported). The second column gives the percentage of cities in which the research staff judged this action to be the single most significant one, in terms of amount of public attention and number of students involved. Table 3 shows that in 85% of the cities, the most significant action involved some degree of desegregation.

An Action to Desegregate score for each city was created by simply adding the ranks of the three most radical actions taken; the scores ranged from a low of 12 to a high of 77 (A city which assigned quotas, bussed blacks to the suburbs, and bussed whites to ghetto schools would have received a score of 25+26+27=78).

However, most of the activity was limited to a small number of students. In 1972, Rossell[10] asked each school system to list the schools which they had intentionally desegregated, and computed the number of students involved. Only 63% of the systems claimed to have done anything (indicating that some of the actions reported earlier either never occurred or were so trivial in size as to be forgotten later). Furthermore, the typical city which did act reassigned none of its white students, and only 7.5% of its blacks, in its desegregation plan. While how much action should be considered significant is a matter of taste, we would conclude that about one quarter of the school systems adopted a major desegregation plan. While this may be more than the reader expected, it still means that the demand for desegregation failed more often than it succeeded.

The Analysis of the Impact of Various Actors on the Decision

Since we had no satisfactory model of the time at which each actor participated in the decision, a general linear regression model was used, entering the background factors first (explaining 16% of the variance) followed by the six largest predictors of action to desegregate (explaining an additional 31%) from among 10 variables describing the

attitudes and behavior of the mayor, superintendent, school board, the civic elite, and the civil rights movement. We then added (one at a time) the remaining 4 of the 10 variables and also measures of white citizens-group activity in support of or opposition to desegregation to produce seven additional equations. (Since analysis suggested that white "grass roots" behavior was largely a response to other actors' behavior, these variables were not permitted to enter the general equation). The dependent variable (action to desegregate) and city size were both normalized. Comparison of the zero-order correlations of column 1 of Table 4 to the standardized regression coefficients of columns 2 and 3 indicate that multicollinearity was generally not a severe problem (the exception is population growth rate). Table 5, which presents a portion of the correlation matrix, indicates that intercorrelations among the political variables were not high enough to cause serious problems.

Table 4 contains some expected results (that the superintendent and the mayor are key figures) and some surprises (that desegregating cities have large foreign-stock populations, that the civic elite plays an important role, and that desegregating cities do not have more liberal mayors or school boards). But in this paper we are interested in examining only the five italicized variables in Table 4: <u>school board internal conflict, civic elite support for the civil rights movement, civil rights activity, and organized white "grass roots" support and opposition to desegregation.</u> For clarity, these five variables are grouped together on the right of the matrix in Table 5.

Second Finding: Conflict within the School Board Facilitates Desegregation

We asked four school board members and the superintendent a total of fifteen questions dealing with the presence of several kinds of disagreements, the frequency of heated debates, and the amount of social contact on the board. We found that school desegregation was more likely to occur in cities where the school board members had less friendly interaction and more conflict. The fact that β is larger than r in Table 4 indicates that school board conflict occurs in cities where the other actor's characteristics are not conducive to desegregation. In particular, school board conflict tends to occur in cities where the mayor did not support desegregation ($r = -.18$) and where the superintendent of schools exerted less leadership ($r = -.13$). School board conflict is also associated with more white grass-roots opposition ($r = +.26$).

It seems unlikely that the school desegregation decision, important though it may be, could single-handedly set the tone for the school boards internal relations on all issues. It seems more likely that conflict is a characteristic of some boards and not others (perhaps because of the political style of the city and the way school board members are usually recruited)[11] and these boards are more likely to desegregation.

It should be observed that this finding, coupled with the failure of action to desegregate to correlate with board member attitudes, clearly disagrees with Crain, Inger, McWorter and Vanecko.[12] There are many methodological differences between the two studies, which

might explain these differences, but we are inclined to think that the differences in the time of the two studies is the key. Crain et al.'s interviewing was done in 1967, when desegregation was still being debated in most of the 8 northern cities studied; their scoring system tended to rank as most "acquiescent" those districts which had settled the desegregation issue, giving lower scores to those where the debate was still in progress. Since 1967, the acquiescent districts have done little to desegregate, and some of the others (particularly Buffalo, San Francisco and Boston) have passed them in degree of desegregation. Liberal, unified boards were able to respond quickly and sometimes satisfy the civil rights movement with an acquiescence which was mostly symbolic; divided boards could not, and in the long run were forced to do more.

Third Finding: Civil Rights Demonstrations Generally Did Not Facilitate Desegregation

Table 4 seems to support the argument of The Politics of School Desegregation that civil rights demonstrations were ineffective in desegregation controversies. The correlation between amount of activity and amount of action to desegregate is negative. The negative relation indicates that demonstrations are more a response to a district's failure to desegregate than a cause of desegregation.

One reason why civil rights activity has little impact is that the non-violent demonstration is not a strong coercive device. Since they can really do little financial or other harm there is little reason for the school administration not to ignore a sit-in, street demonstration or boycott. Contrast this to the position of the teacher's union, which can, by going out on strike, threaten to close the schools indefinitely - for all students. If the strike runs for any length of time the mayor and the school board members can expect voters to be angry. By comparison, the civil rights movement was a weakling indeed.

It is ironic that a school boycott is less effective in a segregated system, since white students in all-white schools are unaffected by the closing down of black schools.

The Anti-Conflict Bias of the Civic Elite

Civil rights activity was ineffective for a second reason: it created a backlash among white elites. The names of the civic elite were obtained by asking five of our informants to list the persons they considered civic leaders --"people who have been active in supporting various community programs and in bringing new programs to the city; or, on the other hand, persons who have been active in opposing or trying to significantly alter such programs." (Government employees or officials were not to be included.)

We then asked a school board member to review this list and identify those leaders who had been "favorably disposed" "opposed" or "pretty much neutral" toward the local civil rights groups and their demands. Few civic leaders are considered opposed to the civil rights groups, but many are neutral. On a scale from 0 (opposed) to 1 (favored) with .5 for neutral, the average score is .66 -- somewhere between neutral and favorable.

One of the main findings of our study is that civic elite support for civil rights was strongly negatively related to civil rights activity ($r = -.39$). This last correlation may indicate that a lack of elite support causes the civil rights movement to demonstrate more, but we think it more likely that high levels of civil rights activity causes elites to withhold their support. We think this is likely because the civic elite is unaccustomed to (and perhaps upset by) public conflict -- civil rights activity is out of keeping with the elites' normal world of charitable fund-raising, testimonial dinners, and public service on behalf of public projects such as urban renewal which, while sometimes controversial, are usually handled with gentlemanly standards of debate.

This suggests a reason why the southern civil rights movement could not function successfully in the north. In the south, street demonstrations, coupled with police brutality prompted a northern liberal reaction and the passage of civil rights legislation. When the civil rights movement tried the same tactics in the north there was no group of outside liberals to be offended by the behavior

of the school boards of Milwaukee, Oakland, or Boston. If the civil rights movement was to attain its objective of being martyred and becoming a moral force it would have to do so by enlisting the support of white elites in the same city. This is precisely what they were unable to do. The correlation coefficient here, -.39, is one of the very largest in our entire analysis. Roughly, it can be translated into the statement that civic leaders were two or three times more likely to support the civil rights movement where there were fewer desegregation demonstrations than where there was a large amount.

Elite support for desegregation is strongly associated with action to desegregate; we think this means that elite support encourages the school system to desegregate.

When the elite endorses desegregation, it lends its prestige and legitimacy to it; its resources include a social network of relations with the right people, and the school officials are likely to remember the importance of the elite on financial matters.

Fourth Finding: White Grass-roots Activity is Also Ineffective

We asked a school board member if there had been meetings of whites who were opposed to school desegregation; if he or she said yes, we asked how many meetings there were and how many people attended the largest, and combined the two responses. (The same questions were used to record opposition meetings.) Table 4 shows no evidence that either kind of grass-roots activity affected the outcome. Opposition meetings tend to occur in cities with high action to desegregate.

Apparently white grass-roots opposition is a response to desegregation, just as civil rights activity is a response to a refusal to desegregate.

The issue is difficult, since we do not have longitudinal data which would be necessary to untangle a complex web of white activity both causing and being caused by school system action. But we do know this much: there are very few cities, if any, where a massive set of anti-integration meetings were held and no desegregation took place. Perhaps better measures of white citizen activity would show a different pattern, but with the data we have, we can only draw a portrait of an elitist decision-making machine which is either insensitive to or alienated by efforts of the masses to generate conflict. Similarly, we cannot find any evidence that grass-roots white support for desegregation made any difference, since support is not more likely to appear in cities which have taken steps to desegregate.

GENERALIZING TO A SET OF HYPOTHESES

We now must put these four findings together into a consistent set of statements. Recall that our question is, "Does a political actor with few resources profit from using conflict-raising techniques?" The answer is sometimes yes, and sometimes no, and our next task is to develop a set of hypotheses which explain why conflict is helpful in some ways and harmful in others. Our propositions are hypotheses only; they are consistent with the data, but data on a single issue do not constitute strong evidence for them.

Proposition 1: A non-issue can be made salient by a powerless group with conflict-raising tactics. Conflict can create an issue, partly because to engage in conflict, to violate the gentleman's agreements of everyday politics, harms its opponents (through embarrassment, for example). In addition conflict serves notice that the powerless group is angry, concerned, and committed. Conflict is the expenditure of a resource (one's reputation as a "gentleman") and creating conflict demonstrates both a willingness to risk one's reputation and a confidence that one's supporters will agree that ungentlemanly behavior is not inappropriate. To engage in conflict is to advertise that one is not embarrassed by conflict--the conflict creater is in effect saying "I am morally right, and my constituency will support me."

Proposition 2: The presence of a tradition of conflict is a facilitator of change. This proposition is a corrollary of Proposition 1; for if conflict can be used to generate an issue, disapproval of conflict by a group (such as a harmonious school board) can serve to prevent issues from being raised. Conversely, a group with a tradition of conflict (like our high-conflict school boards) encourages proponents of change, who rather than being conflict-shy, may look forward with pleasure to making some long-time enemy in the group squirm.

Proposition 3: Grass roots activity without the support of some elites is often ignored by other elites. Our rather convincing data on the failure of both civil rights demonstrations and white grass roots activity merit advancing this general proposition. (We also have other data in our monograph supporting the idea that coalitions with

elites are effective in producing change.) We think that this general proposition is more true than false because decision-makers, whether civic leaders or city councilmen, value "face-to-face opinion"--the reaction they see from persons of their own status in informal meetings--more than public opinion and indeed often take the elitist view that public opinion is easy prey for demagogues. The social rules of courteous debate are functional because informal interaction is so frequent in the day-to-day behavior of elites, that high levels of conflict would be stressful. Thus a mass movement with no elite support for legitimacy and which uses conflict-creating tactics offends the elite in two ways.

Proposition 4: Conflict is generally dysfunctional if a decision for change must be made by an informal decision rule based on consensus politics. Many major decisions in cities are made by a consensus rule which in effect requires both a commitment of effort by some leaders and near-overwhelming majority support from a number of relevant actors. For example, a typical urban renewal plan requires considerable effort by some leader inside the government and one or more civic leaders who must work with enthusiasm for some time. If they do not receive encouragement, the civic leader can withdraw, and the government official can divert his resources to some other needy area of the city. Encouragement turns out to mean the support of the mayor and a number of other leaders, and the opposition of no more than a few notables who can be dismissed as self-interested, as cranks, or as extremists.[13] Face-to-face interaction among friends, acquaintances, and colleagues plays an important role in defining whether one has received "encouragement" to desegregate just as it does to others

decisions. While technically the school board had the authority to make the decision, our data indicate they were dependent on the (volunteered) support of the mayor and civic leaders, and the (also voluntary) enthusiasm of the school superintendent.

We noted earlier conflict is a weak form of coercive force; it is harmful to its opponents by being psychically painful, producing disagreements among friends, embarrassment, loss of status, anxieties and feelings of guilt. But such force is ineffective for producing change if change must occur by a consensual decision process, for the civic and political leaders can respond to the pain of conflict by simply withdrawing, isolating the school board and in effect preventing the formation of the coalition necessary to produce change.

Proposition 5: Conflict-increasing tactics are less likely to be self-defeating, and may be helpful, in a group with compulsory attendance and a decision-making rule requiring less than unanimity. This is a corrollary of Proposition 4. Examples of groups with compulsory attendance are bureaucracies, legislative bodies, and firms; in all cases a person with influence over the decision cannot withdraw except at some cost. This may turn the main disadvantage of conflict-raising tactics into an advantage; for if people cannot withdraw, then they can only escape the pain of conflict by settling the issue, which will frequently mean a compromise--and compromises usually imply some amount of change. Finally, if a

written decision rule exists (requiring only a simple majority, for example) there is no disadvantage to alienating a minority of the decision-makers.

These five propositions we draw from a comparative study of a single issue - northern school desegregation. Testing their generality depends on our ability to obtain comparable data on other issues.

TABLE 1

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

1. City editor of a major local newspaper
2. 1955 School Board member
3. Mayor or his administrative assistant
4. Political leader of the party opposite the Mayor
5. A major civic leader in the community
6. An informed civil rights leader in the community
7. Superintendent of schools
8. PTA President
9. A "moderate" civil rights leader knowledgeable about city schools in 1963
10. A "moderate" civil rights leader knowledgeable about city schools in 1968
11. A "militant" civil rights leader
12. A black politician
13. A black businessman
14. A current member of the school board who is black
15. A current member of the school board who is knowledgeable about the desegregation issues in the city
16. A current school board member who is knowledgeable about school board elections or appointments
17. A current school board member who is knowledgeable about school finances
18. A member of the school superintendent's staff
19. Education Reporter of a major newspaper



Fig. 1: Model for data-analysis of school desegregation decisions

TABLE 2

CORRELATES OF ABSENCE OF FIRST MAJOR

DEMAND FOR DESEGREGATION

BACKGROUND VARIABLES:	CORRELATION WITH ABSENCE OF FMD
City Size (log)	-.19
% white collar	.10
% black	-.15
Median years of school completed	.17
Ratio city to metropolitan population	-.02
"NEED" VARIABLES	
Index of segregation	.00
Perceptions of Educational Quality:	
All students	.15
Black students	.25
Expectation for quality of education in future:	
All students	-.11
Black students	.13
MILITANCY VARIABLES	
Earliness of black political victories	-.17
Number of office blacks have been elected to	-.23
Civil rights groups commitment to black power	-.22
Presence of black power-type groups	-.21
Self-rated militancy of civil rights groups	-.35

TABLE 3

Percentage of Cities Ever Taking Each Action

Most Significant Action Ever Taken by a City, at Any

Time, Listed in Order of "Radicalness"

Ranking of Radicalness, low to high	Percentage of cities taking this action	Percentage of cities which this action was the most significant
Symbolic-Procedural		
1. Submit anti-civil rights statement	15%	0
2. Do nothing; ignore the demand		0
3. Provide data or information about the school system	15%	0
4. Appoint a committee to study problem	55%	0
5. Submit a pro-civil rights statement	42%	0
6. Prepare a plan to attack the problem	29%	0
7. Dismiss the superintendent	3%	0
Voluntary Participation		
8. Initiate compensatory education	79%	3%
9. Initiate supplemental centers	3%	0
10. Improve facilities for blacks; reduce overcrowding	22%	1%
11. Appoint a human relations committee, establish human relations workshops	12%	0
12. Initiate Black Studies Program; improve the curriculum	54%	8%
13. Hire more black teachers and/or administrators	35%	2%
14. Integrate the faculty	15%	1%
15. Initiate a program of community control	4%	1%

TABLE 3 CONTINUED

Ranking of Radicalness, low to high	Percentage of cities taking this action	Percentage of cities which this action was the most significant
Forced Participation		
16. Limit open enrollment	2%	0
17. Initiate or expand open enrollment	45%	10%
18. Do not build a school because it would become segregated	1%	0
19. Redraw school boundaries;change feeder patterns	44%	19%
20. Bus for overcrowding	37%	14%
21. Create a middle school	5%	1%
22. Bus to integrate	36%	11%
23. End tracking;integrate classrooms	3%	3%
24. Close a school	22%	19%
25. Assign racial quotas	3%	3%
26. Bus students to the suburbs	3%	3%
27. Bus whites to black schools	2%	2%
		101
		(N = 91)

TABLE 4

REGRESSION EQUATIONS PREDICTING ACTION TO DESEGREGATE

	0-order r	Standardized Coefficients ( )	
		general regression equation	other regressions**
BACKGROUND VARIABLES			
City Size	.10	.10	
Pop. Growth	-.08	.20	
Median Educ.	-.04	-.09	
Pct. For. Stock	.32	.24	
Pct. over Age 65	.23	.23	
Eastern Region	.22	.13	
Midwest	-.18	.04	
West	.07	.02	
Border	.17	†	
School Board Elected	.04	.12	
POLITICAL VARIABLES			
Supt. Support	.28	.29*	
Board Conflict	.23	.30*	
Mayor Support	.16	.25*	
Elite Support	.25	.27*	
Elite Active	.07	.20*	
C. R. Groups Unified	.31	.17	
No. of Black Elected	.01		(-.04)
Board Liberal Atti.	.03		(.01)
Civ. Rts. Activity	-.14		(-.11)
Mayor Liberal Atti.	.17		(.10)
WHITE GRASS-ROOTS ACTIVITY			
White Citizen Support	.06		(.02)
White Citizen Opposition	.23		(.23*)

TABLE 4, CONT'D.

Notes:
† redundant term omitted
*signif., $p < .05$

**parenthetical values are produced by adding this variable only to general regression equation. Thus column 3 reports the results of six separate regression equations.

Variable Definitions:
Census variables are for 1960.

Supt. support: report of superintendent's "leadership role by reporter, civil rights leader, black and white board members.
Board Conflict: reports from 4 board members and superintendent to nine questions about voting, personal contacts among board members, heated debates at board meetings.
Mayor support: report by mayor or his administrative assistant on 12 possible actions he may have taken; score is number of pro-desegregation actions minus number of anti-desegregation actions.
Elite support: one board member was given a list of civic leaders (generated by 5 "reputational" interviews) and asked to identify every leader who supported civil rights demands.
Elite active: The most prominent civic leader (identified by reputational method) was asked 3 questions about activity of elite in major community projects.
Civil Rights groups unified: 2 civil rights leaders were asked to rate the degree of unity of the civil rights movement on each of previous 6 years.
No. of black elected officials: One black political leader was asked to report the pressure of blacks in each of eight types of offices, ranging from Congress to city council.
Board liberal attitude: 4 board members responded to a six-item racial attitudes scale.
Civil rights activity: The reporter and a civil rights leader reported number of demonstrations, sit-ins, or school boycotts directed to the school desegregation issue.
Mayor's liberal attitude: Mayor's response to questions about fairhousing, employment discrimination, and his position on race vis a vis his opponent.
White citizen support: A board member reported number of meetings and attendance at largest meeting held by whites in support of desegregation.
White citizen opposition: similar to white citizen support variable.

TABLE 5: CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	SIZ	FOR STK	CL ACT	CR UNI	BLK ELE	BD LIB	SUP SPT	MAY LIB	MAY SUP	SB CON	ELT SUP	CR ACT	WH SUP	WH OPP
CITY SIZE (LOG)	--	.12	.14	-.17	.56	.22	-.11	.35	-.01	.13	.10	.12	.22	.15
% POP. FOREIGN STOCK		--	-.20	.03	-.13	.27	-.19	.22	.01	.19	.12	.07	-.05	.06
CIVIC LDR. ACTIVITY			--	-.09	.13	-.06	.07	.20	-.02	-.14	-.04	-.05	.10	-.09
C. R. GROUPS UNIFIED				--	-.20	-.02	.35	-.15	.01	.12	-.02	-.10	.07	.05
# BLKS IN ELEC. OFF.					--	.12	.07	.10	-.14	.26	.10	.01	.10	.15
BRD. LIB. ATTITUDES						--	-.07	.33	-.13	.01	.11	.07	.20	-.09
SUPERINT. SUPPORT							--	-.19	-.02	-.13	-.05	.12	.03	-.10
MAYOR'S LIB. ATTITUDE								--	.13	-.02	.13	-.10	.03	.10
MAYOR'S SUPPORT									--	-.18	-.03	-.03	.00	.10
SCH. BRD. CONFLICT										--	-.03	.06	-.03	.26
CIVIC ELITE SUPPORT											--	-.39	.18	-.13
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITY												--	-.08	-.08
WHITE CITIZEN SUPPORT													--	.28
WHITE CITIZEN OPPOS.														--

FOOTNOTES

(Identifying Footnotes are on a Separate Sheet)

1. Identifying footnote

2. James S. Coleman, Community Conflict, (New York: Free Press, 1957).

3. William Gamson, "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics," Am. Soc. Rev., 31 (February 1966), 71-81.

4. It should be noted that this definition is more restricted than the commonly cited one by Lewis Coser: " a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources, in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals." See his The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), p. 8.

5. Identifying footnote

6. Peter H. Rossi, "The NORC Permanent Community Sample", Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Summer, 1968), 261-272.

7. Treating people being interviewed as informants rather than respondents allows the researcher to replace one informant with another if that first informant is unable or unwilling to be interviewed. The assumption is that the second, or any other suitable informant, will bring the same general point of view to bear when describing actions in the city. One consequence of such a procedure is extremely high response rates.

8. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, (New York: Holt, Reinhart, Winston, 1960); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power", American Political Science Review, 56, (1962), pp. 947-52; Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

9. Identifying footnote

10. Identifying footnote

11. See Henry J. Becker, "The Social Structure of School Board Recruitment", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1973.

12. Robert L. Crain, Morton Inger, Gerald McWorter, James J. Vanecko, The Politics of School Desegregation, (Chicago, Aldine, 1968).

13. See James J. Vanecko, "Resources, Influence, and Issue Resolution in Large Urban Political Systems: The Case of Urban Renewal", unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967.

IDENTIFYING FOOTNOTES

1. The data reported here are taken from David J. Kirby, T. Robert Harris, Robert L. Crain, and Christine H. Rossell, Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath, 1973). We would like to acknowledge Christine Rossell's and T. Robert Harris' important contributions to this project, and Laura Morlock's help in the reanalysis of data for this paper.

5. The sampling, questionnaires, and scale construction is described in detail in Kirby, et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation.

9. See David Kirby, An Analysis of the Political Behavior of Big City School Superintendents, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1970 for a discussion of how the training and background of school administrators affects their political behavior including their response to desegregation demands.

10. See Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation, Chapter 12, and Christine H. Rossell, "The Electoral Impact of School Desegregation in 67 Cities", unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1973.